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Court, 18 or the Court's procedures and customs.I9 Storm Center 
offers the alternative of a readable, reliable, up-to-date, general book 
on the High Court. College and law school professors take note. 
I regret the necessity of adding one unpleasant fact: the bind-
ing of my hardcover copy was exceedingly flimsy. Caveat emptor. 
SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 
Edited by Robert A. Goldwin• and Art Kaufman.2 Washing-
ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research. 
1986. Pp. xi, 193. Cloth, $21.50; paper, $11.00. 
Frank J. Sorauf3 
I confess that I would have abandoned this volume somewhere 
in midstream had I not committed myself to review it. As it turned 
out, that would have been a mistake. I would have missed the final 
essay, a gem by James Ceaser, which rebuts much of the formalism 
and reformism of the previous essays. 
The problems begin with the title. Most of the eight essays in 
the book do not really answer the question it poses: does the sepa-
ration of powers still work? Rather, we have here a poorly joined 
debate about whether the American political system suffers from 
deadlock and whether, since the deadlock results from the separa-
tion of powers, constitutional changes are necessary. It is an 
argument that has been floating around for some time but that has 
been given a new immediacy and audience-or funding-by the Bi-
centennial. The real subject is perceived policy-making deadlock 
and political fragmentation in American government. A systematic 
analysis of the separation of powers in contemporary American 
policymaking is nowhere in sight. 
By now the protagonists are familiar. Lloyd N. Cutler, Wash-
ington lawyer and member of the Carter administration, opens the 
volume with an adaptation of an academic lecture that had ap-
peared in Foreign Affairs in 1980. Noting the difficulty of assem-
bling congressional majorities behind coherent programs (which, it 
18. E. WITT, A DIFFERENT JUSTICE: REAGAN AND THE SUPREME COURT (1986). 
19. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, JUDGES AND JUSTICES (1979). 
I. Resident scholar and director of constitutional studies at the American Enterprise 
Institute. 
2. Acting director of education programs at the Commission on the Bicentennial of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
3. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
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turns out, are programs of the president), he argues that the oppo-
nents of presidential programs 
would probably be unable to get together on any overall program of their own or to 
obtain the congressional votes to carry it out. As a result the stalemate continues, 
and because we do not form a government, we have no overall program at all. We 
cannot fairly hold the president accountable for the success or failure of his pro-
gram, because he lacks the constitutional power to put that program into effect. 
In short, we do not have a parliamentary system. We have instead 
something called separation of powers, and it must, therefore, be 
deficient, if only because it precludes the institutions that permit 
strong action behind coherent policies. 
Two other protagonists-Donald Robinson and Charles Har-
din-join Cutler with essays of their own. Their nouns may differ 
("impotence" rather than deadlock, for instance) and their exam-
ples may differ, but the argument is essentially the same. Robinson 
writes of the failure of the Congress: 
The creaking operation of the budget process shows that Congress has come 
about as far as it can come. It can never again assume leadership of the American 
government. Modem conditions forbid it. Political opposition or plain incompe-
tence may cause the president to slip from the driver's seat, but 535 members of 
Congress cannot take his place. 
For his part, Hardin pitches quickly into the solutions. 
Simpler remedies, such as the single six-year term for presidents, will not do. 
suggest a change that consciously replaces the separation of powers between the 
president and the Congress with a separation between the government and the op-
position. . . . The presidential loser would be given a seat in the House of Repre-
sentatives, there to become the leader of the opposition. If they became 
disenchanted with their losing candidate, the members of the opposition party 
might remove him; but (as in the Bonn constitution) they would be required to 
replace him. With this one move the people ... would, in their palpable experience 
as the electorate, create both the government and the opposition. 
Robinson's remedies, though somewhat different, are no less 
draconian; they involve a unicameral Congress, the calling of new 
elections by a two-thirds vote of the Congress, appointment of 
members of Congress to administrative offices, a council of notables 
to choose a chief of state. Cutler is more tentative, often hedging 
his recommendations with the conditional "could," but they are in 
the same spirit of reconstructing American government in some va-
riant of British parliamentary institutions. 
The remaining five essays are a very diverse lot. The ultimate 
test of a collection like this is coherence; on a scale of ten, this vol-
ume merits only a two or a three. William Gwyn provides a learned 
and thoughtful survey of institutional arrangements in democracies, 
the gist of which is that the distinction between systems with and 
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without a separation of powers is not as clear as we assume; one can 
find separation in parliamentary systems. Ann Stuart Anderson 
and L. Peter Schultz provide essays on the separation that seem to 
be heavily influenced by the analytical style of Leo Strauss and his 
students at the University of Chicago. They reflect the deductive 
methods and the emphasis on textual meaning and original inten-
tion that marks the Straussian constitutional analysis. This is how 
Anderson writes about "checks" in the separation: 
They are intended first to maintain the separation of the elected branches of the 
government and second to enable the executive, by means of his constitutional pow-
ers, to moderate the law-making process to produce more sound and decent legisla-
tion. Ultimately, checks are to prevent deadlock. The political branches-
legislative and executive-are given the constitutional means to resist encroach-
ments so that, once these means are exhausted, governing will and can go on. If 
there were no constitutionally legitimate means of self-defense, the elected branches 
would be likely to resort to nonconstitutional means at such times, which would 
destroy the Constitution and with it our form of government. 
This kind of argument does not move me. Those readers more sym-
pathetic to it than I am will, I imagine, find the Anderson and 
Schultz essays useful. 
The remaining essays are by Ceaser and James Q. Wilson. To 
them falls the task of rebutting what Ceaser calls the "zero-based 
constitution makers." Wilson's piece meets the issue obliquely, fo-
cusing on the relationship between political parties and the separa-
tion. He cogently rebuts the reformers of a generation ago-those 
who wanted to transcend the divisions and deadlock of the separa-
tion with disciplined parties capable of governing. He exposes the 
inadequacies of that school, with clearheaded analysis and a sophis-
ticated grasp of congressional politics. 
It is Ceaser who responds most directly to the current genera-
tion of constitutional Anglophiles. His essay is a compelling mix of 
passion, scorn, wit, and insight. A few examples will suffice. On 
the reformers: 
Self-proclaimed "children of the Enlightenment," they judge political life not from 
the somber perspective of what can go wrong but from the sunny perspective of 
what can be improved. 
On the importance of specific institutional arrangements: 
.. one of the most striking facts about liberal democracies is the diversity of their 
institutional forms. This diversity should make it clear that in discussing the differ-
ences among the mechanical systems of liberal democracies, we are not dealing with 
a first-order question. 
On the relativity of policymaking under the American constitution: 
For the almost 200 years during which the government has operated under the 
1988] BOOK REVIEWS 
Constitution, there have been a number of policy-making systems, ranging from the 
dominant congressional model of the nineteenth century to the strong presidential 
model of most of the postwar period. 
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But Ceaser offers more than criticism and counterargument. He 
explains, far better than the reformers, the sources of the political 
deadlock and fragmentation that they seek to cure. The problem is 
not the separation, he argues, but a combination of a new populism, 
resurgent legislative power, judicial activism, and the politics of 
entitlements. 
Space does not permit a full summary of Ceaser's argument. 
But one more point seems so central to the whole issue that it begs 
for mention. 
Modem political science has extended the study of regimes beyond their formal 
mechanisms to such other factors as informal structures (for example, parties and 
interest groups), social structure (for example, class and ethnic composition), and 
political culture (for example, animating principles and attitudes about the political 
world). It is to these other factors, no less than to the formal mechanisms, that we 
must look to understand how any system works. 
This is the kind of analysis that is missing in the Cutler-Robinson-
Hardin argument. Without such an analysis, one cannot under-
stand the differences between the policy-making politics of the 
1880s and those of the 1980s. 
In our time the policy-making institutions of American govern-
ment have been profoundly affected by a whole raft of changes in 
the American electorate and American politics. One need only 
mention the explosion of groups and their lobbying, the decline of 
political parties, the spread of the participatory ethos, the greater 
importance of issues and ideology, the advent of a media-based ple-
biscitary democracy, the transformation of campaigning and cam-
paign finance, and the introduction of new issues (equality, life-
style, and the environment, for instance) onto the political agenda. 
Needless to say, policymaking in the Congress and the executive 
branch isn't what it used to be. 
All of this, of course, presumes that there really is a problem in 
the first place. As Ceaser points out, the charge of deadlock often 
masks disappointment about specific political events. Those who do 
not share a critic's agenda may feel quite differently about the 
"deadlock." The deadlock thesis also reflects a preference for co-
herent, systematic, and positive government action rather than the 
messy compromises and half-measures that mark much of Ameri-
can policymaking-a preference for the ability, as Cutler puts it, "to 
formulate and carry out an overall program." Plainly, there are 
political choices here that merge with the lofty constitutional 
questions. 
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There are still many Americans who think that disorderly 
compromises and incremental changes are not all bad. Policy that 
responds, however incoherently and eccentrically, to the welter of 
groups and interests in our society may be preferable to coherent 
programs that, as Mrs. Thatcher has demonstrated, can be ex-
tremely divisive. In addition, some of us still think that the checks 
on executive power in the American separation may not be all that 
bad either. The Iran-Contra episode was only the last of many 
proofs over the past 25 years that American presidents can commit 
serious sins of both omission and commission. If we have learned 
anything we must have learned that. 
Those things said, however, a mindless complacency about the 
performance of the policy-making institutions is no more defensible 
than the wool-gathering of the reformers. Robinson's prime exam-
ple-the inability to address the budget deficit effectively-is one 
that most of us would fully concede. But a solution, or at least a 
positive course of action, would exist if President Reagan would 
compromise on cutting defense spending and/ or raising taxes. De-
spite the separation of powers and the different partisan control of 
the two branches, a little old-fashioned compromise and leadership 
would do the job. Behind the President's intransigence, of course, 
stands an electorate that is unenthusiastic about sacrifice, not 
greatly concerned about the deficit, and not at all censorious toward 
a president who won't provide leadership on such matters. The 
American political system is enormously responsive, and by and 
large we get the policies we want and deserve. No constitutional 
change or revision will save us from ourselves. 
Perhaps a broader range of intellectual styles and points of 
view would have improved this collection. There is a certain clubbi-
ness evident in the project. Of the ten persons involved in it (two 
editors and eight authors), at least five had or have organizational 
ties to the American Enterprise Institute. Moreover, a significant 
number of them have had ties of one sort or another to Chicago-
style political science. It is a kind of political science very much in 
vogue in Reagan's Washington, but it remains a relatively minor 
current in academe. I mention the point because the selection of 
participants shapes both the definition of the problem and some of 
the approaches to it. More specifically, the AEI and Chicago links 
appear to explain the shortage of essays by informed scholars of 
contemporary national policymaking. 
At the risk of sounding like a hopeless Scrooge, let me also 
record my doubts about the wisdom of participation by funding 
agencies in scholarly projects. This book was funded in part by the 
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National Endowment for the Humanities. One of the eight essay-
ists, L. Peter Schultz, is described as "working for the National En-
dowment for the Humanities." The Endowment, its staff, and its 
grantees (and their editors) should, I think, be more careful to ob-
serve the proprieties and to avoid the appearance of backscratching 
in matters such as this. 
In short, this volume offers less than it should. It has its 
strengths-the essays of Ceaser, Gwyn, and Wilson-but it all adds 
up to les~ than the sum of the parts. The best advice I could give a 
reader interested in the kind of institutional reform propounded 
here would be to take a look at James Sundquist's Constitutional 
Reform and Effective Government, published in 1986 by the Brook-
ings Institution. It, too, suffers from some degree of institutional 
formalism and a neglect of extrainstitutional political processes, but 
it is far more knowing about the realities of policymaking and insti-
tutionallife. In the battle of the Washington think tanks, score this 
round for Brookings. 
THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACf. By Charles Whalen' 
and Barbara Whalen.2 Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press. 
1985. Pp. XX, 289. $16.95. 
Michael R. Belknap3 
For years lawyers and historians have needed a good history of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is probably the most important 
civil rights statute ever enacted by Congress. Scholars have chroni-
cled the enactment of the less significant Civil Rights Acts of 1957,4 
196Q,s and 1968,6 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.7 But the gi-
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